During the implementation of market-based reforms in mobile telecommunications, the Brazilian Government opted for dividing the country in ten regions, thus creating a highly fragmented market. Later on, through several mergers and acquisitions the market was consolidated by three main foreign groups. This paper analyses the rationale behind the Government's decision to fragment the market and describes the events that led to consolidation. It identifies the different strategies adopted by the companies and the overall competitive landscape of the mobile market that emerged after the process of consolidation.
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions have played a significant role in changing the competitive landscape in mobile telecommunications markets throughout the world (Curwen and Whalley, 2004; Economist, 2005; Whalley and Curwen, 2005) . After the privatisation and liberalisation of the markets that happened mainly in the second half of the 1990s, foreign direct investment was a particular way to foster competition in developed and developing countries alike by increasing the number of competitors. The process of consolidation among mobile telcos is driven by economies of scale and scope, faster access to foreign markets and increased sources of revenues (e.g. international roaming) (Chan-Olmsted and Jamison, 2001; Hallowell, 1999 ). In the current highly competitive mobile market, the role of brand awareness is also a key driver for M&A activity (Vodafone, 2005) . This process of consolidation is happening in a global scale (i.e. Vodafone's extensive M&As), in one region (i.e. Orange in Europe, BellSouth/Telefónica in Latin America) and even within a country (i.e. Cingular/AT&T Wireless and Sprint/Nextel in the USA).
Largely overlooked has been the substantial M&A activity in the Brazilian mobile market.
Foreign companies have transformed the market structure from a highly fragmented one, with 40 regional mobile operators, to a consolidated market, where the four main operators control 92% of the subscribers. In fact, Brazil is one of the best examples of the market forces that favour companies' consolidation and the role played by the government in this process (hindering and encouraging its occurrence). Two interesting points emerge from these events: to understand why the Brazilian market was so fragmented and to analyse the role of foreign investments on the subsequent consolidation.
As a consequence, this paper is structured in three more sections. First, the process of privatisation and liberalisation of the Brazilian mobile market and the Government's rationale for fragmenting the market are analysed. Then, the main drivers of the consolidation of the market are presented and the process of joint ventures and M&A that happened is discussed. The data that underpins the descriptions of the companies is drawn from a variety of sources such as annual reports, websites, consultancy reports and the popular business press. Through drawing on a broad range of sources it was possible to triangulate the data to ensure that the descriptions are as accurate as possible. Finally, some discussions of the companies' strategy and conclusions are drawn in the final section.
Fragmentation
Since its creation in 1972, up to its privatisation in 1998, Telebrás was the stated-owned monopoly telecommunication operator in Brazil 1 . Telebrás was, in fact, a holding company that comprised 27 regional operators and Embratel, which was responsible for national and international long distance service 2 .
This purely state model, however, began to show signs that it was reaching the limit of its effectiveness at the end of the 1980s. The worldwide telecoms sector was already undergoing rapid technological changes and demanded fast reactions from telcos to meet the growing demand for increasingly specialised and sophisticated services. Telebrás and its subsidiaries, however, did not have the ability to meet this growing demand for investments. As a state-owned company, Telebrás was subject to wide-ranging regulation by the Communications, Finance and Planning Ministries and its investments had to be included in the annual Federal budget and approved by Congress. In addition, the absence of competition, due to the monopoly, did not offer Telebrás any incentive to improve its services (Ministry of Communications, 1996) . Telebrás was not efficient enough to cope with the market demands. In urban centres like Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo, it was common for a fixed telephone line to be sold for U$7,000 on the black market (Anatel, 2000) .
Mobile Service was implemented in Brazil in 1990 and was operated by each of the 27 Telebrás subsidiaries. The mobile service had similar problems as the fixed telephony, with huge pent-up demand and inadequate quality of service (Anatel, 2002) . Another characteristic of the telecommunications scenario in Brazil prior to the implementation of market-based reforms was the inequalities of telephone distribution across the country. In 1994, for example, the disparities between states regarding the teledensity were impressive, in some cases attaining a difference of 29 times from one state to another (Anatel, 2000) . This situation was reinforced by the social and economical inequality between regions of the country and represented a key challenge that the Government had to deal with. For instance, in the northeast region of the country the income per capita is 50% of the Brazilian average and only 35% of the income per capita of the southeast region (which is responsible for 58% of the country's GDP). This inequality is also true regarding the population density, which is 20 times greater in the southeast than in the north 3 .
1 There were four other companies, which were responsible for less than 5% of the telephones lines: CRT -controlled by the State Government of Rio Grande do Sul; CTBC -private company in operation in some small cities in Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul; SERCOMTEL -municipal company in the city of Londrina; and Ceterp -municipal company in the city of Ribeirão Preto (Ministry of Communications, 1996) .
2 For details regarding the creation of Telebrás see Novaes, 1998 . 3 See Ferreira, 2004 and Baer, 2001 for a detailed analysis of social and economic inequalities in Brazil.
The process of privatisation and liberalisation of the market started in 1995 with the Constitutional Amendment no. 8, which along with the law no. 9295 of 1996 and the General Law of Telecommunications (LGT) of 1997 constitutes the regulatory framework for the market-based reforms of the telecommunications sector (for more details see Mattos and Coutinho, 2005) . The National Regulatory Agency (Anatel) was created in 1997 4 . The reform of the telecommunications sector in Brazil was designed to achieve five major objectives:
-strengthen the regulatory role of the State and eliminate its role as an entrepreneur;
-increase the range and improve the quality of telecommunication services;
-in a competitive environment, create opportunities that encourage investments and foster technological and industrial development;
-provide conditions so that the sector development is consistent with the country's goals for social development; and -maximise the sale value of state-owned telecommunication companies without prejudicing the foregoing objectives (Ministry of Communications, 1996) .
In the 1997 auction for the B-band (850MHz) mobile licences the Government wanted to ensure that there were a reasonable number of new operators (Ministry of Communications, 1996) .
Therefore, the rules of the auction divided the country into ten licence areas, which were then divided into two groups: the first included all the more economically favourable areas and the second included the less favourable areas. Each potential buyer of a licence could only buy one company in each of the two groups. The rules also precluded any change in the control of the companies before 60 months of commercial operation, in order to allow regional competition to be established. The auction was considered a success with the government raising a total of U$7.44 billion 5 , a premium of 236% over the minimum price (Novaes, 1998) .
The privatisation of the fixed and mobile Telebrás subsidiaries took place in July 1998 and, as in the case of the B-band, the Government imposed certain restrictions on acquisition by a single group of more than one company. This was consistent with the Government's intention of having a fragmented market 6 . The auction raised a total of U$19 billion 7 , of which roughly U$ 7 billion was raised by the sale of the mobile operators. These values represented a premium of 64% for Telebrás as a whole and a premium of 189% for the mobile operators, over the respective minimum price.
4 See Bogdan-Martin and De La Torre, 2001 for a detailed analysis of Anatel. 5 All the figures are expressed in US$, based on the interbank exchange rate at the time. 6 It is out of the scope of this paper to analyse the effectiveness of the public policies adopted. 7 The share of the companies on auction was 19.26% of the total capital. Foreign investors held approximately 40% of the total capital and the remaining shares were held by telephone owners (Novaes, 1998) .
One of the key decisions for the liberalisation and privatisation of the mobile market was to divide the country in ten regions (see Figure 1) . But why fragment the market in the first place?
Four factors lead to the reasoning behind the Government's decision to divide the mobile market at the time of the implementation of market-based reforms. Firstly, the social and economical regional inequalities in the country represented a strong motive against selling national licences. Due to the existing pent-up demand, the companies could be tempted to operate the service only in the richest regions, therefore widening the disparities within the country. Secondly, the historical division of Telebrás and its subsidiaries provided a more straight forward way to sell the assets of the incumbent. This also facilitated the transition from a public to a private model, since the companies were operated separately in each State of Brazil.
Thirdly, the division of the market in many companies represented the means to even the information asymmetry between the companies and the regulatory authority, hence preventing any abuse of market power by the companies 8 (Ministry of Communications, 1996) . Fourthly, by dividing the country into several regions the Government could maximise the revenue from the auctions. Since the full liberalisation of the mobile market took place just three years after the B-band operators had launched commercial services, these companies had to pursue extremely aggressive market entry strategies before a third operator was introduced. This, coupled with large pent-up demand and the poor quality of services provided by the state-owned operators, led to high rates of 6 subscriber growth for B-band operators. In 2001, the year of the next auctions, the B-band operators had an average market share of 32.9% (Anatel, 2001) . A strong performance by the privatised incumbent operators also contributed to the market's remarkable growth since 1998. After the Telebrás auction process, A-band shareholders invested in the newly privatised entities, enabling them to continue (or begin) their digital upgrades (CDMA and TDMA) and launch new services during 1998. Infrastructure investments were crucial, especially to the A-band operators, as these helped relieve the severe capacity constraints of their analogue networks (Yankee Group, 2000) .
By the end of 2001, the Brazilian market had grown to 28.7 million subscribers (17.2% teledensity) from 5.6 million in 1998 (4.5% teledensity). Brazil was then the world's 9th largest mobile telephony market in terms of number of subscribers. Even so, the Government wanted to introduce more competition into the market and conducted the auction for three more licences in each region of the country. In contrast to the previous auctions, the auction of the C-, D-and Ebands saw the country divided into three regions (see dotted lines in Figure 1 ). This division mirrored that of the fixed-telephony auction. After an intense debate, Anatel opted for the 1,800MHz frequency for these new bands (instead of 1,900 MHz), not least because this would facilitate the introduction of GSM technology into Brazil 9 (see Pereira-Filho, 2003) . However, the process of auctioning these new licences was not straight forward. After a complex process of four different auctions 10 , the Government finally succeeded in selling mobile licences in two more bands, D and E (1,800 MHz). Due to the lack of interest by the companies, the Government decided to call off the auction for the C-band. As a result of this process the Government raised a sum of roughly U$2.3 billion and succeed in creating a competitive market for mobile service with four companies in each region of the country 11 .
The 
Consolidation
The 1997 and 1998 auctions created 15 different groups of mobile companies controlling between them 40 mobile operators 16 . To this, the 2001 auctions (D and E-Band) added another 10 more mobile operators (see Table 1 for a complete list of the mobile operators). In addition, in 2001, the biggest mobile operator in Brazil, Telesp Celular, controlled less than 18% of the mobile market. It is not hard to see that consolidation was paramount. Nevertheless, the SMC rules stated that changes in voting control were only possible after five years of commercial operation or after the company adopted the SMP rules.
the mobile customers follow the same way of dialling as the fixed customer, with Carrier Code, and the revenue belongs to the fixed long distance operator. 14 After China, USA, Japan and Russia. 15 Not considering the Federal District, due to specific conditions like small geographic area and population. The Federal District has more than 100% of mobile teledensity. 16 For this reckoning, the definition of 'group of mobile companies' is based on the voting control and of 'mobile operator' is based on the shareholders structure. Sources: Novaes, 1998; Anatel, 2001 and Anatel, 2005 At this time, several international players were present in the fragmented Brazilian market, operations of both groups in Brazil and would be equally owned by the two parent companies. The companies believed that the joint venture would be successful for four reasons.
-both companies used the same digital technology (CDMA) and since the beginning of 2002 both companies had launched services with 2.5G (CDMA 1xRTT);
-the companies had contiguous operating areas. Since the Brazilian legislation does not allow that the same company holds more than one mobile licence in the same area, no operation had to be sold off;
-the control of Brasilcel was equally divided between its parent companies. The CEO being appointed by Portugal Telecom, whilst the president of the administrative council appointed by Telefónica 25 ; and -the experience that the two groups had in working as a joint venture in Morocco. The joint operation in Morocco had been in place for more than two years and no sign of conflict between the partners had appeared.
The joint venture started operations with 13.7 million customers (40% of market share), making it the largest mobile company, not only in Brazil but in the whole of South America. Although not covering the majority area of Brazil, it operated in an area that represented more than 70% of the country's GDP.
Brasilcel's leadership in the market was further reinforced in January 2003 with the acquisition of Tele Centro Oeste (TCO). TCO was the A-band operator in Centre-west region and owned NBT, the B-band operator in the North region. Brasilcel paid U$495 million for 64% of TCO's voting capital (20.69% of total capital). By acquiring TCO, the company increased its customer base to 16.8 million, representing almost half of the Brazilian market and over 11 million more subscribers than its closest competitor. However, TCO used TDMA technology, so investment was needed to install a CDMA overlay. With this acquisition, Brasilcel extended its presence to almost the entire Brazilian market, to areas that comprise 86% of its territory and which produce 83% of the country's GDP (see Figure 2) . Since Telecom Italia owned 38% of BrT 27 , it requested that the company invested to comply with this regulatory demand. However, the other shareholders of BrT, in particular the Opportunity Group, refused to make the required investments. 
Other Mobile Operators
There are five other mobile operators in Brazil. The biggest one is Oi, which has 8.1 million mobile subscribers (10.6% of market share) and is owned by Telemar, the largest fixed operator in the Nevertheless, most of these regional players may be acquired by one of the main mobile groups in the future.
Discussion and Conclusion
With hindsight, it is clear that the decision made by the Brazilian Government to divide the country in ten regions during the implementation of market-based reforms had far-reaching consequences.
This was the key step in improving mobile service in the remote and poor areas of the country, not only by investments in network roll-outs, but also in tariff competition and handset subsidy.
After this fragmented market had accomplished its purpose, consolidation was inevitable given the economics of mobile networks. Among several important players in the mobile world arena that were competing in Brazil, four companies emerged in this process of consolidation: Telefónica, Portugal Telecom, TIM and América Móvil. Significantly, each of the groups employed a completely different approach in the process of consolidation.
Telefónica and Portugal Telecom had a strategy of acquiring mainly incumbent operators (Aband) and avoiding any green-field investments. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 5 , this strategy allowed a fast increase in subscriber base and an Ebitda margin in line with the most profitable operators in the industry (e.g. Vodafone). However, not only the companies paid a relative high price for their acquisitions, but also they where not able to have a very high stake on their new operators, as can be seen by the number of proportionate subscribers. In addition, they opted for a joint venture, which are, however, not without their risks as partners may disagree on strategic and operational issues 35 . Vivo also made a risky bet being the only operator in Brazil to use CDMA technology. Since it does not have licence to operate in the whole country, its customers can not 35 These issues are dealt with at length in the literature, see, for example: Park and Kim, 1997 or Porter and Fuller, 1986. make digital roaming in some areas 36 . Furthermore, the company still has more than 20% of its customers with TDMA handsets and its growth rate is below that of the national average (see Figure   6 ). Another consequence of its option for CDMA is that it has to make higher subsidies on the handsets than its GSM competitors, due to higher scale economies of the GSM technology. On a more positive note, Vivo did not have to build a new network on the top of its CDMA, as was the case with the other operators that had to invest in a GSM network before their TDMA network had completed five years of commercial operation. 36 There is analogue (AMPS) roaming available, although it is subject to fraud, poor battery life and no digital VAS.
América Móvil has adopted a different strategy in Brazil. Through numerous acquisitions and a handful of green-field investments, the company has sought to maximise its coverage area. In the case of the acquisitions, the company had a very interesting approach, targeting companies with financial problems. Thus, the strategy was to buy companies in trouble and restructure them so that they become profitable. The B-band operators were ideal candidates in this respect because they were heavily indebted in US Dollars due to the costs of acquiring the licences and then constructing the network before the bust of the internet bubble and before the depreciation of the Brazilian currency (Real). This strategy is best exemplified by the case of BCP SP. The company paid U$2.6 billion for its licence and supposedly invested a similar amount to build its networks and to acquire its subscribers. At the time of its acquisition by Claro, BCP had debts of U$1.7 billion and had default a short term loan payment of U$375 million, having its debts downgraded as junk and being effectively controlled by a pool of banks. Nevertheless, Claro acquired the company for U$625 million, with shareholders and creditors assuming a huge loss. The strategy applied by América
Móvil allowed almost full ownership of all its operations in the country, as shown by the number of proportionate subscribers in Table 2 . However, Claro has to increase its Ebitda margin, which is the lowest among the Brazilian mobile groups. América Móvil' strategy, which was applied elsewhere in Latin America as well, has proved very successful so far, with its shares increasing by roughly 200% compared to 2001.
TIM's expansion strategy in Brazil was different from those of Telefónica and Portugal Telecom (Vivo) and América Móvil (Claro). Two growth models were adopted: the first is an expansion strategy based on acquisitions and alliances, adopted by Telefónica and Portugal Telecom, on one hand, and América Móvil on the other. The second is a strategy based on integration and synergies among some incumbent operations and several green-field investments, which was the strategy adopted by TIM. Indeed, through an aggressive strategy of green-field investments, it became the only operator to have a national footprint in Brazil, which provided it with an important advantage over its competitors. It allowed a fast growth in subscriber numbers, making TIM the second largest mobile group in the country. TIM enjoys full ownership of its new operations (B-, D-and E-bands), but a much lower ownership of its A-band operations, which is reflected by its number of proportionate subscribers. This is also revealed by its Ebitda margin, with A-band operators with a high Ebitda margin and the other operators with a much lower one, placing TIM's Ebitda margin between that of Vivo and Claro.
As far as technology is concerned, apart from Vivo, all other operators in Brazil have opted initially for TDMA and then for GSM. In fact, the growth of GSM in Brazil was exceptionally fast.
As Figure 7 shows, the number of TDMA subscribers is falling, while the number of GSM subscriber has a steady growth. The number of CDMA subscribers is also growing, although with a slower pace. Foreign investment has proved essential for the development of the mobile market in Brazil.
The process of consolidation carried out by one Mexican and three European companies created big companies with national, or almost national, footprint that changed the market structure and the competitive landscape in place after the introduction of market-based reforms. This process was largely driven by the geography licence area of each operator and by the technology adopted by them.
These foreign companies, however, are soon going to focus on profitability after the investments made in the past years. Though, this slow down in investments may not be in line with the Government's aspiration, as it is due to auction 3G licences soon (which requires more investment by the companies) and is keen to see the continuity of handset subsidy and tariff reduction that increase the affordability of telecommunications in the country. In addition, the three main groups that operate in Brazil also control most of the Latin American mobile market. This raises interesting questions that could complement this paper by (1) analysing whether this will be compatible with public policies and Brazilian interest (2) placing Brazilian investments in a wider context of foreign direct investments in the region and (3) looking more at the interplay between regulation and investments.
